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MASSACHUSETTS SECURITIES REGULATION: IN
SEARCH OF THE FULCRUM
Stephen M. Honigt
The Massachusetts Securities Division and representatives ofthe
Massachusetts Securities Bar are currently reevaluating Massachusetts blue sky regulation. In this article, the author reviews
the existing practices, and concludes that the Division has
waivered between adopting a merit review or disclosure approach to regulation o.f registered and exempt offerings. The
author concludes that vigorous merit review is unjust!fied under
the Massachusetts statute, and advocatesfundamental riform of
existing practices to ensure certainty in regulation and national
uniformity.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Massachusetts securities regulation currently reflects, in a microcosm, competing extremes of regulatory philosophy. At present, it is
unclear whether Massachusetts is a disclosure jurisdiction, a merit review jurisdiction, 1 or a jurisdiction insistent on applying sui generis
standards of review. The competition between disclosure and merit review has left practitioners confused, and has given the commonwealth
a reputation for unpredictability. Until the dominant regulatory fulcrum is identified, the confusion and unpredictability is likely to
continue.
This article identifies and evaluates the regulatory bases, current
practices, and possible trends in Massachusetts regulation of both registered and exempt offerings of securities. Accordingly, this article will
not survey all aspects of Massachusetts securities regulation, but will
concentrate on the philosophical and practical problems with Massachusetts regulation of these important types of offerings.
The article provides some essential background to this discussion
by explaining how recent changes in the organization and staffing of
the Massachusetts Securities Division (Division) have influenced the
present form of regulation. 2 The current pattern of Massachusetts reg-

t

A.B., Columbia College, 1963; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1966; Member,
American Bar Association; Boston Bar Association (Securities Section); Massachusetts Bar Association (Securities Section). The author's professional corporation is a partner in the law firm of Goldstein & Manello, Boston, Mass. The
author acknowledges the substantial assistance of Peter Litman, Esq., and the research efforts of John Ottaviani, Esq.
1. Merit review of securities offerings requires the state securities administrator to
determine whether the substantive terms of the offering are "fair, just, and equitable" to the investor. If the offering fails to meet the standards of substantive fairness, the administrator may deny registration, even if the prospectus adequately
discloses all material information. For a defense of merit regulation, see Tyler,
More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982).
2. See infra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
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ulation of registered public offerings, as well as some current proposals
for reform, are discussed. 3 In addition, the article describes the Massachusetts treatment of exempt offerings, identifies some serious legal and
practical problems, and discusses proposed changes in this area. 4 The
article concludes that fundamental reform of both the philosophy and
practice of Massachusetts securities regulation is needed.
These discussions could not come at a more difficult time in the
history of Massachusetts securities regulation. This article will serve
more as a historical benchmark than a long term guide to Massachusetts practice, because significant changes concerning the philosophical
and technical underpinnings of the regulatory scheme are imminent.
II.

BACKGROUND

The flavor of Massachusetts practice cannot be appreciated without a historical perspective. At least in the memory of active practitioners, the 1932 Massachusetts blue sky law5 presented a relaxed and
uneventful regulatory context throughout its forty year existence. The
Division enforced this law in a manner consistent with a disclosure philosophy. Although it was frequently difficult to find a Massachusetts
exemption applicable to federally exempt private placements, 6 it was
often possible to negotiate a discretionary exemption or to register on a
disclosure basis.
Even after the 1972 adoption of the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act (Massachusetts Act),? a slightly modified version of the Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act),8 Massachusetts practice did not
vary greatly. The early years of the enforcement of the Massachusetts
Act seldom gave rise to debates over the nature of merit review, or the
propriety of particular regulations in light of a presumed philosophy of
disclosure regulation. The Division did not undertake extensive substantive review of publicly or privately offered issues, and it was not
difficult to obtain administrative expansion of the statutorily available
exemptions. Although many of the restrictions on cheap stock that appear in the present Massachusetts regulations 9 were first applied by the
Division in 1973,10 practitioners at least initially found that the Divi3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra notes II-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 56-147 and accompanying text.
1932 Mass. Acts ch. 290, §§ 1-21 (repealed 1972).
Indeed, the principal limited offering exemption was measured only in terms of 25
or less shareholders at the offering's conclusion, but was only available to corporations organized within Massachusetts. Id. § 3(f).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, §§ 101-417 (West Supp. 1983).
VNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 101-419, 7A V.L.A. 567-707 (1958), reprinted in I BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~~ 5501-5573 (1983).
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 31,465 (1983). For a discussion of cheap or insider stock, see infra text
accompanying notes 22-35.
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, §§ 10.00-14.00 (1978) (proposed May 17, 1973).
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sion was willing to make reasonable accommodation upon request of
counsel if adequate disclosure had been made.
After the 1972 reassignment of the Division from the Department
of Public Utilities to the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
and the 1979 appointment of Michael Unger as Director of the Division, however, Massachusetts practice was radically altered. As this article will demonstrate, a consumer protection orientation expressed
through rigorous merit regulation replaced the disclosure philosophy,
and, to the surprise of both the Massachusetts securities bar and out of
state practitioners, the Massachusetts Act came to be enforced as a
merit review statute for both public and private offerings. At present
the merit review philosophy seems firmly entrenched. Although both
the organized bar and a series of formal committees established by the
Secretary of State are working toward greater clarity and predictability
in the regulatory scheme, some element of merit review clearly will
continue to be a hallmark of Massachusetts securities regulation. The
precise degree to which merit review standards will prevail is a matter
of current debate, and practitioners reading this article should take
great care to update its contents.
III.
A.

MASSACHUSETTS REGULATION OF PUBLIC
OFFERINGS
The Regulatory Context

The Massachusetts Act makes it unlawful to offer or sell any security in the commonwealth, unless the security is registered in accordance
with the Act's provisions or the security or transaction in which it is
issued is exempt from registration. II Registration may be obtained by
coordination with a filing under the Securities Act of 1933 12 or by
qualification. 13
Until the Division clarifies its policies, counsel should assume that
Massachusetts is a full merit review state. Although a detailed review
may not be applied in every case, the assumption will avoid unfortunate surprises. The purported statutory bases for merit review appear
in section 305 of the Massachusetts Act.14 Under this section, the Secretary may issue a stop order denying, suspending, or revoking effectiveness of an offering if: (1) "the offering has worked or tended to
work a fraud upon purchasers or would so operate;"15 or (2) the offering involves "unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 301 (West Supp. 1983).
12. /d. § 302; see Securities Act of 1933 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1982).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 303 (West Supp. 1983).
14. /d. § 305.
15. /d. § 305(a)(E).
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participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options." 16
The Massachusetts regulations (regulations) contain the formal articulation of substantive standards derived from these general statutory
provisions. Specifically, the regulations provide that unless an issuer
has been in business for two years it may not use more than ten percent
of the net proceeds to repay loans made by promoters, finders, controlling stockholders, officers, or directors. 17 No offering, whether by coordination or qualification, may result in the book value of common
stock being less than twenty percent of its public offering price. 18 In
addition, the regulations provide that an offering involves unreasonable
underwriter and promoter profits if the aggregate of underwriter discounts, commissions, profits, participations, options, or other consideration exceeds eighteen percent of the aggregate amount of the public
offering actually sold. 19
Finally, the regulations provide that, for corporate issuers, a public
offering of equity securities will be deemed to work a fraud upon purchasers when it is preceded by the issuance of "an unreasonable
amount of promotional or cheap stock."20 The regulations include provisions defining "promotional or cheap stock"21 and establish several
safe harbors useful for avoiding insider stock problems. Strict compliance with these regulations, however, does not necessarily satisfy Massachusetts merit review. 22 The Division today neither systematically
takes action against transactions that violate the provisions, nor consistently clears transactions that comply. Despite this inconsistent practice, the detailed insider stock provisions are instructive and deserve
closer examination.
The regulations define promotional or cheap stock (insider stock)
to include any equity security issued or sold within eighteen months of
the public offering date to underwriters and various insiders at a price
16. ld § 305(a)(F). There are four other instances in which the Secretary may revoke
an offering. See id § 305(a)(A)-(D).
17. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.303(b)(9) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 31,463 (1982).
18. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.304(c) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 31,464 (1982). Commentators have indicated that this and the prior
provision, "because of the regulatory headings under which they fall and because
they would otherwise conflict with the statutory scheme, should be interpreted as
conditions to effectiveness of registration statements . . . ." J. SMITH & Z.
CAVITCH, MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATION LAW 14-34 (1982). In any event, there
is no clear statutory basis under § 304(c) of the Massachusetts Act or elsewhere for
this blanket requirement.
19. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(F) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). Warrants to purchase the security are valued only
to the extent that their exercise price is below the offering price. ld
20. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982).
21. ld These equity securities will be referred to as "cheap stock" or "insider stock"
throughout this article.
22. See infra section III B.
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lower than and not reasonably related to the public offering price?3 In
measuring the reasonableness of price, the following factors are considered: (1) the nature of restrictions on transfer; (2) the existence of contractual provisions that could cause divestiture of the securities; (3) the
extent to which the risk undertaken in the investment is substantially
greater than the risk undertaken at the time of the public offering; and
(4) with respect to securities issued for consideration other than cash,
the opinion of an independent appraiser.24
In addition to defining insider stock, the regulations establish four
safe harbors to avoid insider stock problems: (1) for issuers organized
within eighteen months of offering and in the promotional stage, insider stock issued early in the history of the issuer, that either does not
exceed twenty-five percent of the stock outstanding or is common stock
with an average consideration per share equal to at least two-thirds of
the public offering price;25 (2) for issuers organized more than eighteen
months prior to the public offering date and not in the promotional
stage, insider stock that does not exceed ten percent of the shares to be
outstanding; (3) when the proposed offering price of an equity security
does not exceed twenty-five times the net earnings per share; or
(4) when arrangements have been made for escrow of insider stock for
a period of one year or longer. 26
Those contemplating offerings in Massachusetts should note one
further source of "law" concerning public offerings. During 1980 and
1981, and until a lack of funds and time caused its termination, the
Division published a series of "Massachusetts Securities Bulletins" that
gave practitioners some guidance as to the Division's policy and practice. Although criticized as constituting the issuance of regulations
without compliance with statutory procedures,27 the bulletins nonetheless explained the Division's approach. An explanation in one of the
bulletins of the Division's approach to insider stock problems deserves
detailed description.
The second bulletin issued by the Division made clear that compliance with the terms of the four insider stock safe harbors would not
foreclose further inquiry by the Division. 28 Rather, the Division will
look at all the circumstances of an offering to be reasonably certain that
23.

ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY
~ 31,465 (1982).
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(i) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982).
Options qualified under section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26
U.S.c. § 422 (1982), and options exercisable in excess of 90% of the public offering price, are excluded. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii)(a)
(1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982).
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii)(b)-(d) (1978), reprinted in IA
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982).
The formal requisites of rulemaking appear in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A,
§§ 1-7 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983).
MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 1-2 (Oct. 1980).
MASS.

L. REP. (CCH)

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
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the offering will not work a fraud. 29 If the Division determines that an
offering will work a fraud, it may require that certain remedial actions
be taken as a condition of registration. These actions could include a
restructuring of the transaction, a capitalization of insider debt, or the
escrow of insider stock. 30 Although the regulation refers to escrows
running "one year or longer,"31 the Division made clear in this bulletin
its interpretation of "longer": escrows with a minimum duration of
eighteen months, running as long as five years, with insider stock to be
released from escrow only if certain earnings requirements are met. 32
The bulletin further suggested that in appropriate cases, public shares
would be given a liquidating preference over insider stock. 33
Finally, the bulletin noted that the definition of promotional or
cheap stock provided in the regulations "is not all encompassing and
does not attempt to define every type of cheap or promotional stock,"
and that "[i]n a number of cases, the Division has determined that previously issued shares should be treated as promotional or cheap stock
even though the specific facts do not fall within the definition."34 The
bulletin offered an example of this phenomenon: stock issued more
than eighteen months prior to the public offering date, but without an
intervening change in the affairs of the company so as to justify an
increase in price, could constitute insider stoCk. 35 Presumably the Division will determine when intervening changes justify any increase in
the price of the shares from the original issuance price.
B.

Current Public Offering Practices: Does the Massachusetts Act
Permit "Fair and Equitable" Review?

The discussion above should confirm the general impression held
by Massachusetts securities practitioners that the Division practices an
aggressive form of merit regulation. Indeed, Massachusetts is one of
the twenty-seven members of the National Association of Securities
Administrators Association..(NASAA) Merit Regulation Committee.
In a recent survey36 the Division not only identified Massachusetts as a
merit review state,37 but also answered affirmatively that it uses a "fair
and equitable test or its equivalent," maintaining that the statutory
29.ld at 16.
30. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No. I, at 16 (July 1980).
31. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii)(d) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982).
32. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 17 (Oct. 1980). The earnings
requirement is, generally, a five percent return on the offering price. The "standard" escrow agreement given by the Division to unwary counsel has, as recently
as late 1983, called for a five year escrow.
33. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 17 (Oct. 1980).
34.ld at 16.
35.ld
36. Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importancelor an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689 (1982).
37. Id at 803-05.
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standard authorizing the Division to deny registration to offerings that
work or tend to work a fraud 38 was the equivalent of a "fair and equitable" test. 39
The assumption that the Massachusetts statute and its "work a
fraud" language authorizes the use of a "fair and equitable" merit review is highly suspect. The statutory language is taken from section
306(a)(E) of the Uniform Act. 40 The official comment to that section
states that "this clause is not designed to be as broad as the 'sound
business principles' standard or the 'fair, just, and equitable' standard
found in some statutes."41 Further, the draftsman's commentary to
that section made clear that:
[c]lause (E) is not meant to be as broad as the old "fair, just,
and equitable" standard in California. Somewhere between
the narrow limitation of common law deceit and the opposite
extreme of permitting the Administrator to substitute hIS business judgment for the registrant's, a degree of flexibility seems
to be essential. 42
The Division's approach to "work a fraud" as the basis for a broad
merit review is inconsistent with both the official and draftsman's commentary to the Uniform Act, and the view of commentators that the
work a fraud standard represents the narrowest of possible statutory
bases for merit review. 43 It is quite ironic that a merit standard, originally derived from Populist economic theory in the western and southern states as a defense against the invasion of eastern interests,44 should
be flourishing in Massachusetts, a state that views itself as the prototypical eastern money center. Despite this irony, it is clear that Massachusetts has recently undertaken rigorous "fair and equitable" merit
review as well as very restrictive interpretations of cheap stock, option
38. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 305(a)(E) (West Supp. 1983).
39. Empirical Research Project, supra note 36, at 809.
40. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(E), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 5536 (1980).
41. Id § 306(a)(e) comment.
42. L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 84-85 (1976). The
commentary, however, notes that § 306(a)(F) of the Uniform Act, by calling for
substantive inquiry into unreasonable promoter's profits, addresses one area in
which the blue sky laws have traditionally applied a merit as opposed to a disclosure standard. Id at 85-86.
43. See Bartell, Merit Regulation and Clearing Strategy, printed in STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 315, 317-18 (D.
Goldwasser & H. Makens, eds. 1983). For an analysis of the meaning of the
"work a fraud" language in the Maryland Securities Act, see Sargent, State Limited and Private Offering Exemptions: The Maryland Experience in a National Perspective, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 496,513-14 n.98 (1984).
44. For an analysis of the historical origins of merit regulation, see Bateman, State
Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma and a Suggestion lor the Federal
Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.l. 759, 776-79 (1973); see also L. Loss & E. COWETT,
BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 ( 1958) (discussing history of merit regulation).
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and warrant, escrow, underwriting expense, and offering price. 45 This
type of review of public offerings, including offerings of well financed
companies underwritten by established firms, has created an astonishing pattern of public offerings that cleared with little difficulty in most
states but were delayed or denied effectiveness within the commonwealth. There have been some recent indications of a possible easing
of the literal application of existing regulations and a retreat from a
subjective review of the risks involved in a particular offering. The Division's continued commitment to a rigid form of consumer protection
regulation indicates, however, that until it issues new regulations, Massachusetts merit regulation of public offerings will remain difficult and
unpredictable. 46
C

Current Proposals

In the fall of 1982, the Secretary of State established four committees47 to assist the Division in revising the regulations to produce a
clearer articulation of the standards used to review both public and
private offerings. Although these committees had met on numerous occasions by the end of 1983, no proposed regulations have emanated
from this process. It is likely, however, that significant changes in the
regulations, as well as the issuance of additional interpretive releases,
will soon be forthcoming.
The committee charged with considering regulation of non-taxadvantaged public offerings has addressed two principal concerns: the
definition of insider stock, and the terms for escrow of insider stock.
The Division's identification of insider stock has been an ad hoc process, and negotiated on a different basis each time the matter presents
itself. It is possible that Massachusetts may adopt part of the NASAA
45. See Empirical Research Project, supra note 36, at 804-08.
46. During 1982 and the first half of 1983, the statistical experience of public registrations and filed § 402(b)(9) exemptions in the commonwealth indicates that during
1982, consistent with practices during the approximately preceding two years, a
significant percentage of filings were withdrawn. Conversely, the statistical experience for the first six months df 1983 indicates that a palpably higher percentage
of filings are becoming effective.
Withdrawn
Filed
6 months
Filed Withdrawn 6 months
1983
1982
1982
1983
Type of Filing
Registration by
Coordination or
by Qualification
1,954
67
129
1,513
§ 402(b)(9)
42
Exemption
809
139
670
The practice of the Division is to suggest withdrawal in advance of taking formal
action, so the "withdrawn" category is a catchall both for those transactions that
were abandoned and those that were contested by the Division.
47. The committees consist of approximately 35 practitioners and participants in the
securities industry.
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guidelines concerning cheap stock. 48 Although the NASAA guidelines
represent a rigorous technique of insider stock regulation, they provide
a precise definition of cheap stock. 49 The possibility that the guidelines
may be adopted may be increased by the 1983 induction of Division
Director Michael Unger to the Presidency of NASAA.
The committee's discussion revealed similar uncertainties about
the future of insider stock escrows. Although the committee discussed
one to five year escrows and an apparent consensus developed on the
general imposition of a three year escrow with releases from escrow
based upon earnings or market price, it reached no specific conclusions.
Perhaps a disagreement over the purpose of insider stock escrows is at
the basis of the indecision. Although some believe that escrow provisions should protect public shareholders from the market impact of
blocks of unescrowed shares, the Division seems preoccupied with "unjust enrichment" of promoters holding insider stock.
Similarly, the reasons for placing venture capital shares in escrow
is not entirely clear. Whatever the reasons may be for requiring the
escrow of shares issued to original promoters who are associated with
the early formation of an enterprise, the mandatory escrow of shares
sold in true venture capital offerings prior to the public issuance seems
highly questionable. Although drawing the line between promoter
stock on the one hand and venture capital stock on the other may be
difficult in a particular case, reasonable guidelines are possible.
Whether these committee discussions will result in the fine-tuning
of the existing scheme under the insider stock regulations,50 or in a
comprehensive revision of the current regulations, is uncertain. The
numerical triggers contained in the current regulations, such as the percentage of insider stock permitted to be outstanding after different
kinds of offerings, the ratio of price of prior sales of stock to the offering price, and the multiple of earnings reflected in the pricing of public
offerings,51 appear to be based upon arbitrary figures. The liberalization of these standards awaits the development of a regulatory logic as
opposed to the substitution of newer and more liberal, but equally arbitrary, numerical standards. Indeed, the retention by insiders of a very
high percentage of stock in a strong first-time registrant is viewed by
some Massachusetts committee members as a desirable hallmark of the
quality of an offering. The current regulations, however, reflect a policy decision that public offerings are acceptable only when the insiders'
retained participation is of a decidedly lesser percentage. 52
48. NASAA Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
~~ 5312-5314 (Aug. 1984).
49. Id. ~ 5312.
50. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982).
51. See id.
52. See id.
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In spite of the current committee discussions, the Division has continued to apply very rigorous escrow standards to pending offerings.
These standards have included the imposition of liquidating preferences for publicly issued shares and proposals of five year escrow
terms. The Division has resisted attempts to correlate the release of
shares from escrow with the safe harbors set forth in the regulations, 53
even though presumably falling within those safe harbors might have
avoided the necessity of escrowing shares in the first instance.
Discussions concerning the public offering of tax advantaged programs have focused primarily upon the Division's application of the
NASAA guidelines for real estate tax shelters and for oil and gas programs. 54 The relevance of these guidelines to Massachusetts practice is
a matter of significant debate by practitioners who view Massachusetts
as a disclosure jurisdiction, because the guidelines are premised upon a
broad merit review standard. It is unfortunately clear, however, that
issues of unreasonable compensation to promoters will be left to significant merit review before the Division will grant effectiveness.
D.

A Regulatory Perspective

Unless the Massachusetts Act55 is amended, the commonwealth
will move toward a middle ground that balances the Division's conviction that "fair and equitable" merit review is both justified under the
current statute and essential for consumer protection, and the historical
perspective of most practitioners that Massachusetts is, both as a matter
of law and policy, primarily a disclosure jurisdiction. The importance
of resolving this tension by the generation of a comprehensive, predictable, and clear set of regulations cannot be overemphasized. Many offerings that are routinely cleared in other jurisdictions are not filed in
Massachusetts because of the rigidity and unpredictability of the existing regulatory regime. The commonwealth's role as a capital center
and its continued viability as one of the nation's centers of high technological enterprises require prompt resolution of these important regulatory issues. While most observers do not question the good intentions
of the Division in protecting the public, there is a perception that the
Division lacks the time and expertise to identify an offering that is so
speculative as to "work a fraud." The "I know one when I see one"
mentalit y56 must and presumably will be replaced with the predictability that a well defined regulatory scheme can impart. Only such a
53. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii) (1978), reprinted in lA
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982).
54. NASAA Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs, 1 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~~ 5352-5360 (June 1984); NASAA Statement of Policy for Registration of Oil and Gas Programs, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 5221-5232 (June
1984).
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. llOA, §§ 101-417 (West Supp. 1983).
56. q: Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing test to determine whether matter is obscene).
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scheme can strike a proper balance between the merit review and the
disclosure approaches.
IV.

A.

PRIVATE PLACEMENT OF SECURITIES IN
MASSACHUSETTS

The Regulatory Context

The Massachusetts Act contains several secuntIes and transactional exemptions from registration also found in the Uniform Act.57
The discussion that follows, however, focuses exclusively upon the exemption in section 402(b)(9) of the Massachusetts Act58 and the current
proposals for the redefinition of that exemption. The relation of the
current exemption and the various proposals to NASAA's proposed
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE)59 will also be discussed.
Section 402(b)(9) provides an exemption from registration60 for
the following transactions:
[A]ny transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror
to not more than twenty five persons other than [institutional
purchasers] in the commonwealth during any period of twelve
consecutive months, whether or not the offeror or any of the
offerees is then present in the commonwealth, if (A) the seller
reasonably believes that all the buyers in the commonwealth
[other than institutional purchasers] are purchasing for investment, and (B) insofar as an offer involves the payment directly or indirectly of any commission or other remuneration
for solicitin~ any prosrective buyer in the commonwealth
[other than mstitutlOna purchasers] a notice is filed with the
secretary at least five full business days before the offer, and
the secretary does not by order disallow the exemption within
the next five full business days; but, in any event, the secretary
may by rule or order, as to any security or transaction, or any
type of security or transaction, withdraw or further condition
thIS exemption, or increase or decrease the number of offerees
permitted, or waive the conditions in clauses (A) and (B) with
or without the substitution of a limitation or remuneration. 61
The Massachusetts Act substantially altered the exemption contained in the Uniform Act by increasing the number of offers within the
commonwealth (to other than institutional purchasers) from ten to
twenty-five, and by eliminating the Uniform Act's absolute prohibition
57. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402, 7A U.L.A. 631-42 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
~ 5542 (Jan. 1982).
58. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11OA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983).
59. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.)
(1983), reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982).
60. The registration provisions appear at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11OA, §§ 301,
403 (West Supp. 1983).
61. Id. § 402(b)(9).
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of payments of any commission for solicitation. 62
Most practitioners, when the Massachusetts Act was adopted, presumed that the section 402(b)(9) exemption would operate in much the
same manner as the private placement exemption under prior law.
Section 402(b)(9) was not regarded as embodying any particular concern with payment of indirect commissions or other remuneration for
solicitation beyond the requirement of a notice filing. Furthermore,
practitioners viewed the exemption as self-executing, provided the Secretary did not affirmatively disallow the exemption within the five days
following the filing of the notice. 63
Nonetheless, commentators have noted that regulatory developments have substantially eroded the section 402(b)(9) exemption, and
have turned the exemption into something of a registration process. 64
Despite the clear language of the statute, the Division has consistently
maintained that it is entitled to apply merit review standards over a
broad range of matters whenever a notice is filed under section
402(b)(9). The first issue of the Massachusetts Securities Bulletin explained the Division's rationale:
[B]ecause the language of Section 402(b)(9) must be read and
interpreted within the context of the antifraud provisions, its
exemption is not self-executing, i.e., simply a notice filing and
the passing of the requisite five business days does not automatically bestow exemption status upon the offering.
Therefore, the granting of a 402(b)(9) exemption requires
an active response from die Division: a thorough, intensive
review of every offering conducted within the statutory time
limit defined under the Section. 65
In conjunction with this announcement of the Division's intention to
apply substantive merit review to exempt offerings filed under section
402(b)(9), the Division announced that it would no longer follow the
previous practice of liberally granting an expansion of the number of
offerees within a twelve month period from twenty-five to some greater
number, typically less than fifty.66
Given the professed intention of the Division to provide merit review to offerings involving underwriter compensation, it is necessary to
determine the existence of underwriter compensation triggering the sec62. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983) with
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982).
63. Herwitz & Pokross, Massachusetts Securities Act, 1972 ANNUAL SURV. MASS. LAW
521,528 (1972); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp.
1983).
64. SMITH & CAVITCH, supra note 18, at 14-27.
65. MASS. SEC. DIV., 1 MASS. SEC. BULL. No.1, at 15 (July 1980).
66. fd. at 10.
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tion 402(b)(9) filing requirement, and the scope of merit review to be
applied if a filing is made.
1.

Indirect Remuneration

Section 402(b)(9) requires a notice to be filed if either direct or
indirect remuneration is paid. 67 The Massachusetts Act does not, however, define "indirect remuneration." The Division takes an extremely
broad view of what constitutes indirect remuneration for the purposes
of section 402(b)(9). Although the statute calls for a filing only if an
offering involves payment directly or indirectly of any commission or
other remuneration 'jor soliciting" any prospective purchaser in the
commonwealth,68 the Division has construed the provision much more
broadly.69 A recent policy statement issued by the Division's General
Counsel indicates that it is the Division's view that "any form of payment received by a seller, sponsor, promoter, or principal of any offering will be considered to be 'indirect remuneration', thereby obliging
the offeror to file a notice in accordance with Section 402(b)(9), absent
a showing of extraordinary circumstances. "70 The General Counsel
reasoned that because the filing requirement was designed to enable the
Division to evaluate the adequacy of disclosure concerning the investment program and to determine the reasonableness of the seller's and
promoter's compensation, the words "indirect remuneration" must be
interpreted broadly.7l On that basis, the Division stated that indirect
remuneration included (1) any profit on the sale or lease of any services; (2) any management, consulting or other fees charged at above
customary rates; and (3) any payment made to any person connected
with an offering that is based upon a percentage of the funds to be
raised.72
The effect of the General Counsel's position, applied literally,
would be to expand the number of situations in which indirect remuneration is involved, thus triggering the section 402(b)(9) filing and
merit review process. For example, the payment of a salary to the principal of a corporate issuer, following completion of the offering, and
the repayment of a loan out of the proceeds to an insider would both
constitute indirect remuneration subject to section 402(b)(9) merit review. In addition, the General Counsel's construction would characterize as indirect remuneration the payment to an affiliate of an issuer for
the transfer of property or technology to the issuer, even at fair market
value. Further, and perhaps most importantly given the intensity with
which the Division focuses on tax advantaged offerings, the General
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983).
68. ld (emphasis supplied).
69. MASS. SEC. DIV., 2 MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 9 (Nov. 1981).
70.ld at 8.
71. ld at 9.
72.ld
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Counsel's interpretation of indirect remuneration would include certain
payments to a general partner of a tax shelter partnership. Specifically,
the following payments would be included: a rent-up fee upon the
rental of real estate, a fee in exchange for the guaranteeing of debt or
the completion of a project, a management or consulting fee, the retention of a wrap mortgage on the transfer of real property to the program,
and the retention of an interest in the value of capital transactions that
the Division considers disproportionate to the cash investment of the
general partner, even when this interest arises only after recovery of all
of the participants' investment.
Because the Division's position requires filing of a section
402(b)(9) notice with respect to most, if not all, private placements
within the commonwealth, the General Counsel's interpretation has
been the subject of intense and continuing debate within
Massachusetts.
Several factors indicate that the Division's position is not justified
under the Massachusetts statute. First, such an all inclusive interpretation is not justified by the language of section 402(b )(9). Had the legislature intended a virtually universal filing it would have so stated in
clear language.
Second, although the Uniform Act differs from the Massachusetts
Act in that the former absolutely prohibits sales remuneration, the official commentary to the Uniform Act on this topic is instructive. The
official comment to section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform Act indicates that
the drafter did not intend to preclude all solicitation by directors, officers, or employees of the issuer. Solicitation is permissible:
so long as it is only an incidental function of their regular
duties and they receive no additional compensation. It is also
relevant whether persons are specially hired in connection
with the offering, particularly if they have a background in
the securities busmess either as professional promoters or
otherwise. 73
This official commentary suggests that benefits accruing to affiliates of
the issuer, in contrast to payments directly related to a professional solicitation effort, are not intended to be included in the ambit of the
phrase "commission or other remuneration [given directly or indirectly] for soliciting any prospective buyer."74
Third, an analysis of the three cases cited by the General Counsel
as authority for his interpretation of the broad scope of "indirect remuneration" does not support his conclusion. To support the Division's
73. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9) comment, 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982).
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis supplied); see UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9) comment, 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted
in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982).
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interpretation, the General Counsel relied upon Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc.,75 Petroleum Resource Development Corp. v. State,76
and Upton v. Trinidad Petroleum Corp. 77 A brief review of these cases
gives some insight into the willingness of the Division to extend the
Massachusetts practice to, and perhaps beyond, its statutorily justifiable limits.
In Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc.,78 the Supreme Court of
Arkansas held that an initial consultation fee given to a promoter was
indirect remuneration. The promoter, Rector-Phillips-Morse (RPM),
sold ten percent interests in an apartment complex venture for $23,500
each. After receiving $235,000 and before the actual construction of
the complex, RPM paid itself a $28,000 "consultation fee." No explanation was given as to what services were compensated by this fee. In
addition, each investor was to pay RPM an annual consultation fee of
$100, and a separate trustee was to manage the apartment complex for
$1200 per month. 79 The limited offering exemption provided by the
Arkansas statute80 contained the Uniform Act's absolute prohibition on
remuneration. 81 Even though RPM disclosed its consultation fee to potential investors,82 the Schultz court concluded that the initial consultation fee was remuneration for the solicitation and sale of the interests to
the investors. 83 In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed that
RPM's fee for consulting services was derived from the "proceeds of
the joint venture units sold to the investors" and was paid when liquid
assets first became available. 84 Apparently, the court viewed this arrangement as the equivalent of the payment of a sales commission to
RPM, thus making the exemption from registration unavailable.
Petroleum Resource Development Corp. v. State 85 involved the offering of fractional interests in oil and gas leases, with Petroleum Resource Development Corporation (PRDC) as the promoter. Originally,
PRDC used commissioned salesmen in its promotion. The Oklahoma
Securities Commission (Oklahoma Commission) requested that PRDC
discontinue this practice because PRDC had not registered the securities with the Oklahoma Commission and the payment of commissions
to the salesmen would make the statutory limited offering exemption
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

261 Ark. 769, 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977).
585 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1978).
652 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1981).
261 Ark. 769, 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977).
Id. at 774-75, 552 S.W.2d at 6-7.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1248(b)(9) (Supp. 1975) (current version at id. (1980)).
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted in I BLUE SKY L.
REp. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982).
RPM disclosed a consultation fee of $48,000 when it actually received only
$28,000. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 784,552 S.W.2d at 12.
Id. at 785, 552 S.W.2d at 12.
Id. at 784, 552 S.W.2d at 12.
585 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1978).
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unavailable to PRDC. 86 PRDC amended its offering to provide that
the company would drill, and "if appropriate" would complete and
equip the wells from the sales revenues. The cost for drilling the well
was estimated at $28,280 and the cost of completing and equipping the
well was estimated at $47,158. PRDC projected that the revenues
would be $63,404.22 to drill the well and $68,496.95 to complete and
equip the well. Any costs in excess of the estimated amounts to be
raised from investors were to be paid by PRDC, but PRDC was allowed to retain any surplus remaining from the drilling revenues after
the well was drilled and any surplus remaining from the completing
and equipping revenues after the well was finished. In addition, PRDC
retained a 23.5% working interest, although it contributed no capita1. 87
PRDC then applied for a prospective exemption under the limited offering provision. The Oklahoma Commission denied the application
because the "proceeds retained by [PRDC] in excess of the direct and
indirect costs allocated to the exploration project are in fact, a form of
indirect remuneration for the solicitation of sales within the meaning of
[the Oklahoma exemption]."88 PRDC subsequently sued, seeking a reversal of the Oklahoma Commission's decision and a confirmation of
its right to sell the interests without registering the offering. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected PRDC's argument that the indirect remuneration limitation on the exemption was meant only to prohibit the use of paid professional salesmen. 89 The Petroleum Resource
court stressed that PRDC could not circumvent the statute merely by
calling the surplus a "supervisory fee" because the Oklahoma legislature "specifically included indirect remuneration in the limitation,
wisely forseeing a possibility, such as present here, that a company
might attempt to circumvent the limitation."90 The possible retention
by PRDC of any surplus in the sales proceeds, the court concluded,
constituted indirect remuneration for the solicitation of buyers within
the meaning of the exemption. 91

Petroleum Resource has been criticized for suggesting that any sum
received by a promoter not directly attributable to costs of the venture,
such as legitimate management or supervisory fees, might be considered indirect remuneration and thereby defeat the use of the exemption.92 The decision provides no guidance for distinguishing between
these payments and remuneration for solicitation.
The third decision relied upon by the Division, Upton v. Trinidad
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15) (West Supp. 1983).
Petroleum Resource, 585 P.2d at 347.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Id.
Note, Securities Regulation: Hidden Danger of Indirect Remuneration and the Limited Offering Exception in Oklahoma, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 924, 929 (1979).
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Petroleum Corp. ,93 involved the promotion of interests in an oil and gas
operation by Charles Beard, the sole shareholder in Trinidad, the issuer. Beard was also the sole shareholder of Beard & Associates, which
owned a seventy-five percent interest in the lease on the land where the
well subject to the offering was located. Beard & Associates sold the
lease interest to Trinidad for a $3,500 profit. Trinidad then signed a
"turnkey" contract with a drilling company for drilling the well, resulting in total project expense to Trinidad of about $81,500. Trinidad,
while retaining a twenty-five percent interest, collected $147,000 from
the investors, each of whom had a contract that specified that his
money was to be applied to drilling costs only. After the well proved to
be dry, Trinidad did not refund any of the excess money; rather, it used
the surplus for normal operating expenses. 94
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
two possible sources from which Beard and Trinidad could have received "indirect remuneration," thereby preventing Trinidad's offerings from qualifying for the Alabama limited offer exemption: (1)
Beard's $3,500 profit on the sale of the leasehold interests to Trinidad;
and (2) the funds that Beard and Trinidad collected that greatly exceeded the actual costs of drilling the well. 95
With respect to the latter, Trinidad contended that the amount,
which totaled over $65,000, was "the type of profit to which any business corporation is entitled."96 The Upton court disagreed, stating that
"the money retained by Trinidad was not a profit in the ordinary sense
in that it was not derived from the operation of the business. It flowed
directly from the investors to Trinidad as a consequence of Beard's efforts to solicit purchasers of interests in [the well]."97
Trinidad also argued that the excess was not remuneration but was
a "reserve for contingency." The Upton court suggested that this reserve could be maintained and not constitute remuneration if it bore a
"logical relation to the actual risks involved," which would have been
over one million dollars if a major "blow-out" had occurred. 98 The
court also noted that any such reserve should contain "some mechanism for returning the excess to the investors on a pro rata basis in
cases where, as here, the contemplated contingencies do not materialize."99 Trinidad, as offeror, did not return the excess, using it to cover
not only the drilling costs of the well, but also the overhead expenses of
its entire corporate operation. 100
In evaluating the importance of these cases, it should be noted that
93. 652 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 425-26.

95. Id. at 426.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 427.
99. Id.
100.1d.
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all of the three cited cases are from jurisdictions other than Massachusetts and not from major securities law courts. Each of the three cases
involves a tax shelter program and, perhaps by current standards, an
abusive tax shelter program. 101 In addition, all of these cases represent
examples of extreme fact patterns from which general rules should not
be derived. These examples of promoter profiteering cannot support
the General Counsel's apparent position that virtually every section
402(b)(9) transaction contains indirect remuneration requiring merit
review. Finally, the Division's construction of the "indirect remuneration" provisions is not in accord with the understanding of the Massachusetts securities bar at the time of the adoption of the Massachusetts
Act that the section 402(b)(9) exemption would not be restrictively applied. Most practitioners are thus of the view that neither the Massachusetts statute nor the authorities cited by the General Counsel justify
the broad scope given to the phrase "indirect remuneration" by the
Division. 102
2.

Scope of Review of Section 402(b)(9) Offerings

As explained above, the Division undertakes a merit review of private placement offerings for which filings must be made under section
402(b)(9).103 This review is as comprehensive as the Division's review
of registered public offerings. The basis for this review can be found in
the regulations and in an informal policy statement issued by the
Division.
Under the Massachusetts regulations, the section 402(b)(9) notice
must contain "[i]nformation from which the Director can determine the
commission or other remuneration which will be paid."I04 After the
Division determines the amount and nature of the commission or other
remuneration, it evaluates the payment in terms of the standards applied to the payment of remuneration in registered public offerings. 105
The Division has expressed the policy that:
[t]he standards of Section 305 of the Act [allowing the issuance of stop orders] 106 apply to all offerings made in Massa101. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719-24 (1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 10) (Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) abusive tax shelter regulations). Although the position of
the Division is that indirect remuneration arises in its most pernicious form in tax
shelters, the Division's stated position is that indirect remuneration issues also are
presented in corporate offerings.
102. But see Prince v. Heritage Oil Co., 109 Mich. App. 189,311 N.W.2d 741 (1981)
(retention by sellers ofleasehold interests in gas and oil wells without contributing
proportionate share of capital to the venture was "remuneration" within Michigan's version of the Uniform Act).
103. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
104. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(b)(1l)(F) (1978),reprintedin lA BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,472 (Sept. 1984).
105. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (1978), reprinted in lA BLUE SKY L.
REp. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982) (governing registered public offerings).
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11OA, § 305 (West Supp. 1983).
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chusetts, whether registered or exempt. The primary concern
of the Division is protection of public investors with respect to
all securities offerings, and especially with regard to nighly
speculative and start-up ventures. 107
No current issue in Massachusetts securities practice is more hotly
contested as the scope of review permitted the Division in section
402(b)(9) offerings. The Division imports on a wholesale basis the regulatory scheme for public offerings,108 which consists of several complex rules governing insider stock, price-earnings ratios, the price of an
offering, underwriter compensation, and remuneration of sellers, and
other issues. In addition, the Division will occasionally review a private placement offering on a "fair and equitable" standard and .will
either enter a stop order lO9 to prevent the effectiveness of the section
402(b)(9) exemption, or will advise counsel of the desirability of withdrawing the filing lest a stop order be instituted. Although most members of the Massachusetts securities bar are of the view that section
402(b)(9) permits a far narrower review than does section 305, llO the
Division has continued to engage in comprehensive merit review of
section 402(b)(9) offerings.
The Division's merit review of section 402(b)(9) offerings is not
justified. Section 402(b)(9) requires a filing only when the transaction
involves the payment of commissions and other remuneration for the
solicitation of prospective purchasers. III If the Division is to undertake
any merit inquiry, it would seem logical that it should be restricted to
the issue of remuneration, and only with the remuneration that arises
in connection with the solicitation of investors. Given the language of
section 402(b)(9),112 it is virtually incomprehensible that the section
should be construed to justify a broad merit review inquiry. There appears to be no statutory basis for applying all of the insider stock regulations, 113 issued under section 305,114 to the review of section 402(b)(9)
offerings; section 305 relates to registered offerings that work or tend to
work a fraud upon purchasers. It cannot even be said that the section
305 regulation governing compensation of underwriters and promoters 115 applies to a section 402(b)(9) exempt offering. The section 305
standard includes consideration of promoters' profits and participa107. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No. I, at 16 (July 1980) (footnote added).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 11-45 (describing regulation of registered
offerings).
.
109. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 305 (West Supp. 1983) (authorizing Division to issue stop orders).
110. Compare id. § 402 (private offerings) with id. § 305 (public offerings).
Ill. Id. § 402(b)(9); see supra text at note 61.
112. See supra text at note 61.
113. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982).
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 305(a)(E) (West Supp. 1983).
115. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(F) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982).
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tions, neither of which is the proper subject matter for inquiry under
section 402(b)(9), which speaks only of sales remuneration and not promoter's profits or participation.
B.

Current Private Placement Practices: Merit Review of Exempt
Offerings

Current use of the section 402(b)(9) exemption must be analyzed
from the different vantage points of the corporate offering and the tax
shelter offering. The Division has stated that it actually receives few
section 402(b)(9) notices for corporate issuances of shares of stock or
debt and that it encounters few, if any, abuses or frauds in this area.
This observation seems to make only two conclusions possible: either
both thieves and poor businessmen are irresistably attracted to tax shelter programs and never to corporate investments, or the level of legal
practice within the commonwealth varies radically. Experience suggests that the latter conclusion is correct. It is likely that some practitioners simply do not file section 402(b)(9) notices if a corporate
offering is not formally underwritten. Some practitioners representing
small and unsophisticated corporate issuers may conclude from a cursory examination of section 402(b)(9) and the regulations 116 that a filing is not necessary because no underwriter or broker-dealer is
involved in the transaction. A direct placement of stock to a few investors without the participation of a broker-dealer, an underwriter, or a
finder ll7 might well strike the practitioner as falling outside of the filing
requirements. At the other extreme, the experienced practitioner may
well reject the Division's claims to the contrary and conclude that section 402(b)(9) in fact does not require a notice even if an affiliate of the
corporate issuer will receive a salary, or will convey property to the
issuer in exchange for part of the proceeds of an offering, or will have
his loan repaid from the proceeds.
Indeed, it may be that many practitioners remain unaware of the
Division's position that any payments to attorneys or accountants by
the promoter or offeror in connection with the evaluation of a private
placement constitutes indirect remuneration within section 402(b )(9). lIB
This position is especially questionable when a sophisticated group of
ventuJ;e capitalists purchases the stock of a corporate issuer and the
116. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(b)(9) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L.
REp. (CCH) ~ 31,472 (Sept. 1984).
117. A finder is a "person who, for consideration, participates in the offer to sell, sale,
or purchase of securities or commodities by locating, introducing, or referring potential purchasers or sellers." Michigan Uniform Securities Act, MICH. COMPo
LAWS ANN. § 451.802(u) (Supp. 1982). Michigan is the only state that formally
distinguishes the finding function from the brokerage function. See Hampton,
Broker Dealers, in MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION, A BLUE SKY LAW COMPENDIUM 65, 88-89 (1983) (c. Moscow & H. Makens, eds.).
118. See MASS. SEC. DIV., 2 MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 8-9 (Nov. 1981); see supra
notes 67-72.
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corporate issuer pays the fees of the attorney representing the investor
group. This type of arrangement does not present the opportunity for
abuse that the notice procedure under section 402(b)(9) was designed to
prevent.
The greatest current activity in section 402(b)(9) filing arises in
connection with tax sheltered programs. The intensity may result in
part from the vitality of today's tax shelter market and in part from the
sophistication of counsel to these types of offerings. No easy generalization can be made concerning the current treatment of these
programs.
As a starting point, an issuer must understand that each program is
likely to be subject to merit review in great detail. The Division has, in
the private placement context, directly I 19 or indirectly l20 barred the offering of tax advantaged programs involving promoters with disciplinary records, highly speculative programs, programs that might be
deemed under current Internal Revenue Service regulations to be abusive tax shelters,121 programs that are not supported by sufficient legal
opinions, and programs presenting "excessive" direct and indirect remuneration as the Division defines those phrases. It is not unusual, in
a section 402(b)(9) filing of a tax shelter program, for counsel to engage
in intensive negotiation with the Division concerning the method of
calculating the amount of indirect remuneration involved. The Division will tend to include any compensation paid to a finder or brokerage house, any remuneration paid by the offeror to offeree attorneys,
accountants, or other representatives, and many forms of consideration
received by general partners or their affiliates. Examples of this type of
consideration are expense reimbursements to the general partner, payments of fees to general partners for past or future services, any appropriation by the promoters of proceeds remaining after required
expenses are covered, and equity positions held or retained by general
partners or affiliates that are disproportionate to their capital
investment.
Another example is the retention of residuary interest by general
partners or affiliates after the sale and refinancing or other capital
transaction involving the subject property. The Division will treat
these retained interests as remuneration even if they only arise after the
other investors have recovered their investment. Also included are
markups in price or any profit incidental to the use of wrap mortgages
in conjunction with the transfer of property from the general partner or
119. The Division may directly bar the offering by issuing a cease and desist order,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 407A (West Supp. 1983), or by seeking an
injunction, id § 408.
120. The Division often suggests that an offering be withdrawn before taking formal
action. See supra note 46.
121. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719-24 (1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 10); supra note
101.
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his affiliates to the program, and any other present or future payments
to the general partner or his affiliates. The negotiation of the value of
these payments to the general partner, and their relation to the eighteen
percent maximum imported from the public offering regulations, 122
sometimes involves more ad hoc negotiation than the application of
identifiable standards. 123
Current Proposals
As in the public offering area, the Secretary of State has designated
two committees to work with the Division in revising the regulations
governing the private placement of securities. These committees have
addressed both corporate offerings and tax advantaged offerings, and
have focused their attention on the operation of section 402(b)(9) and
the possible addition of a Massachusetts version of the ULOE. 124
Without tracing in detail the tortuous path of these discussions between the Division and the private sector, it now appears that after
NASAA's adoption of a final ULOE at its September 1983 meeting, 125
the Division will push for the adoption of something akin to that
ULOE provision within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. To advance the policy of national uniformity, that provision should closely
follow the NASAA text. Discussions with the Division concerning the
ULOE, however, have revealed its unfortunate enthusiasm for innovation, despite the national thrust toward uniformity. Consequently,
there seems to be a great risk that any Massachusetts provision will
alter the ULOE.
A careful study of the debates over the ULOE discloses in clear
terms the tension in the search for an appropriate regulatory fulcrum;
the debate between disclosure review and merit review has continued.
The Division is struggling with the fact that, basically, the ULOE
makes applicable to the states the federal exemptive scheme embodied
in Regulation D of the General Rules and Regulations of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Regulation D),126 which is a disclosure approach to securities issuances.
Regulation D approaches issuances in tiers based upon the size of
an offering. Offerings at or below five hundred thousand dollars are
not regulated by federal law. 127 Offerings at or below five million dollars are limited to thirty-five purchasers plus an unlimited number of
institutional or "accredited" (wealthy) investors, wherein nonacC

122. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (a)(2)(F) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982).
123. For a statistical summary of the recent private placement experience, see supra
note 46.
124. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.)
(1983) (reproduced at I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982)).
125. Id.
126. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 (1983).
127. Rule 504 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (1983).
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credited investors receive disclosure comparable to that required by
SEC Form S-18. J28 Regulation D also provides that for offerings over
five million dollars, nonaccredited investors must also meet sophistication standards, and a higher level of disclosure, as provided in SEC
Form S-l, is required for these investors. 129
The threshold ULOE issue to be considered by the Division is
whether ULOE replaces, or only supplements, the section 402(b)(9) exemption. The most recent position of the Division is that ULOE
should replace at least section 402(b)(9)(B),130 which applies in instances where a commission or indirect remuneration is paid so that
filing a five day letter is required. This conclusion is indeed unfortunate. In many cases, a commission is paid, or a participant receives
something that the Division would consider to be indirect remuneration under its broad definitions, and yet the transaction will not, for
example, comply with the federal disclosure requirement for offerings
at or below five million dollars. 131 An offering to a modest number of
nonaccredited persons, friendly to the offeror or introduced by a finder,
might well not involve written disclosure complying with S-18 standards, and yet would be exempt under the Securities Act of 1933.132 A
similar exemption should be available under Massachusetts law, and
indeed is available today. The addition of the ULOE should not eliminate that Massachusetts exemption, because in fact numerous legitimate private placements, involving commissions, cannot support the
cost or effort of a SEC Form S-18 disclosure document.
The Division's response is that the continuation of section
402(b)(9) would create a "loophole," because ULOE is unavailable to
persons who, generally, are subject to orders or rulings involving
fraud,133 but no such prohibition applies to section 402(b)(9) offerings.
Although the issue presented could be remedied both today and under
ULOE by making section 402(b)(9)(B) unavailable to certain undesirable persons, the Division's position is illustrative of its perception that
any exemption presents an opportunity to perpetuate fraud by avoiding
merit review.
The Division, at least to date, has been willing to include larger
offerings that comply with the federal provisions 134 into the Massachusetts ULOE, thus adopting the more liberal option of the ULOE official
draft. Although a conservative approach to the rest of ULOE mitigates
much of the progress this inclusion promises, the election to exempt
Rule 505 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1983).
Rule 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1983).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 402(b)(9)(B) (West Supp. 1983).
Rule 505 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1983).
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1982).
UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.)
(1983) (reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982)).
134. Specifically, it has indicated a willingness to include Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings in the Massachusetts ULOE. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505, .506 (1983).
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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transactions over five million dollars that comply with federal law 135 is
a clear acknowledgement by the Division of the realities of raising capital in today's environment.
The Division presently proposes to adopt footnote one of the
ULOE, which discusses the increased risk of fraud in tax shelter offerings and requires, for direct participation offerings only, the preparation of a written disclosure document for individuals who are
"accredited" under Regulation D.136 The Massachusetts Securities Bar
(Bar) has objected, suggesting that the footnote's gratuitous discussion
concerning the risks of shelters is inappropriate for inclusion in governmental regulations, and has suggested that a possible compromise
might be to limit the disclosure obligation to tax shelter deals only,
rather than to all direct-participation transactions.
Indeed, the Division's lack of faith in the SEC's approach to disclosure review is carried further by the Division's refusal to permit the
Massachusetts ULOE automatically to reflect the nature of the Regulation D exemption. The Division claims that, because that exemption
may be amended by the SEC in the future, this agreement would constitute an abrogation of the Division's responsibility, even if the commonwealth were to retain an express right to reject any particular
Regulation D amendment by specific action.
Rule IA of ULOE 137 permits fees in connection with the offering
to be paid only to persons who are "appropriately registered" under
state law. The Massachusetts version proposes to add an exemption for
a general partner who, without a broker, sells not more than one program each year. In light of this additional exemption, Massachusetts
proposes to eliminate the provisions of the ULOE that provide for a
simplified broker registration for persons who become brokers only by
reason of the offering of new issues while not conducting a general brokerage business. The Bar has urged a reversal of the Division's position to permit a limited registration, noting that otherwise the
Massachusetts statute requires a fully registered broker to be registered
with the SEC. 138 Even the most prudent of general partners is unlikely
to undertake this obligation. The Division claims that a full registration is required for investor protection, but suggests the issuance of an
interpretive release stating that a bona fide general partner is not a broker-dealer, requiring any registration, because he is not in the business
135. Rule 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1983).
136. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.)
note 1 (1983) (reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct.
1982». Footnote one of the ULOE states that a written disclosure document
must be provided to accredited persons who, by reason of their status, would
otherwise not necessarily receive a formal document. Id.
137. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) rule
lA (1983) (reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982».
138. For the SEC broker registration provisions, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.501 to .510
(1983).
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of brokerage. This release would be welcomed by the Bar, although it
is analytically inconsistent with the provision of an express exemption
for a general partner selling a single program each year, since that general partner theoretically will be exempt by the definitional release.
The Division proposes, with general assent of the Bar, to adopt
rule IB of ULOE,139 making the exemption unavailable to so-called
"bad boys," who are persons involved in an offering who have had
recent involvement in fraud, suspension or other disciplinary action in
the securities, or similar fields. Similarly, there is little resistance to the
adoption of rule ID of ULOE, 140 which adds to Regulation D a suitability requirement to individual nonaccredited investors, which can be
met generally either by financial status or investor knowledgeability.
Perhaps the two most hotly contested areas are those of a numerical limit on the number of permitted investors in a ULOE exempt
transaction, and the nature and timing of the filing to be made with the
Division. Regulation D permits an unlimited number of accredited
purchasers, plus thirty-five purchasers nationally. 141 The Division proposes an absolute maximum of thirty-five purchasers within Massachusetts, both accredited and nonaccredited. Although this proposal
represents some progress conceptually from the current limit of twentyfive o/.fers, 142 it is inconsistent with national ULOE uniformity and appears to be an arbitrary mathematical limitation without any functional
rationality.
The question of timing of filings highlights the Division's resistance to surrendering its ability to conduct substantive review. ULOE
contains options for filings prior to sale, or afterwards. 143 Under Regulation D, the SEC filing generally is due after the sale. l44 The Division has proposed a filing, in all cases, ten days before the sale. 145
Further, the Division seeks filing of all offering materials. This
requirement is inconsistent with the Division's expressed positions that
it does not want to conduct merit review under ULOE, that it does not
require any review of corporate offerings because of an historical absence of abuse in corporate private placements, and that it does not
have sufficient staff to process any more paperwork. In addition, the
Secretary's committee expected that some mechanism probably would
be provided for post-sale filing, without inclusion of offering materials,
139. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) rule
IB (1983) (reproduced in I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982».
140. Id rule lD.
141. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), -.506(b)(2)(i) (1983); see id § 230.508(e)(I)(iv).
142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983).
143. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.)
note 4 (1983) (reproduced in I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982».
144. Rule 503 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a)(I), (3) (1983).
145. Under the Division's proposal, it would add a clarification that the holding of
funds in escrow is not the equivalent of a sale.
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at least for corporate offerings and perhaps for all except tax shelters. 146
There is indeed the possibility that the Massachusetts ULOE will
not be available for tax-shelter offerings that fall within certain IRS
standards of abusiveness 147 or for which there exists no supporting authority for the availability of the posited tax benefits. Presumably, this
program could be filed under section 402(b)(9) if that statutory exemption remains unaltered. The nature of the review to be given an offering under section 402(b)(9), which fails to meet standards for even a
pre-filing review under a ULOE procedure, should not make the sponsor of the program optimistic about prospects for clearance.
The Division's decision to seek pre-sale filing for all types of offerings, with offering materials, represents a retreat in concept that has left
the Secretary's committee unclear as to whether the Division is serious
about its promised reorientation of regulatory thinking. If a ULOE
that is to contribute to regulatory uniformity, and that is to constitute a
departure from merit review, the resolution of this issue is perhaps the
litmus test. The Division's view that uniformity justifies requiringprefiling in all cases is not persuasive. The Division's assertion that prefiling will facilitate a "substantive" review that is somehow less than a
"fairness" or "merit" review remains an encouraging but untested regulatory promise.
The Division will soon formally issue its new private offering regulations, affecting among other things both section 402(b)(9) offerings
and ULOE. There will follow an opportunity for discussion and testimony. Given the philosophical ambivalence of the Division, only the
conclusion of that process will disclose the shape of Massachusetts regulation. A regulatory fulcrum, either disclosure or substantive review,
must soon be selected in Massachusetts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Massachusetts securities regulation presently is in a state of flux.
Beginning with a statute that is, in essence, the Uniform Act, the Division by enforcing the statute and issuing regulations has expanded the
statute so that current practice is often indistinguishable from openended "fair and equitable" merit review.
Although recent developments, including the operation of several
appointed committees and general pronouncements by the Division of
an intention to reform its practices, at least outside of the abusive tax
146. It has always been clear, if not desirable, that tax shelter offerings would be subject to pre-sale filing together with the offering materials. Some Massachusetts
practitioners believe that at least these offerings will be given merit review in spite
of the prohibition of such review by footnote 5 of the ULOE. See UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AMER. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) note 5 (1983)
(reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982».
147. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719-24 (1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 10) (IRS abusive
tax shelter regulations).
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shelter area, must be taken as constructive indications for the future,
nonetheless current Massachusetts practice is slow and unpredictable
and suffers from an inability fairly to identify the degree to which merit
review will be applied to both public and private offerings.
Unless and until the Division, the practicing Bar, and the securities industry reach some sort of an accommodation so that a comprehensive and predictable set of regulations can be issued, Massachusetts
will continue in its current and unenviable position as an enigma to the
uninitiated, and as a frustration even to those who practice in the commonwealth. This reevaluation of policy will perhaps result not only in
clear regulation, but also regulation that is reasonably uniform with the
rest of the country.
ADDENDUM
As this issue went to press, the Division amended section
14.402(b)(13) of title 950 of the Massachusetts Administrative Code to
provide a "Massachusetts Uniform Limited Offering Exemption"
(MULOE) for use in connection with offerings under Rules 505 and
506 of Regulation D. The amended rule became effective September
14, 1984. MULOE is a significantly broader exemption than that available under section 402(b)(9) of the Massachusetts Securities Act, and as
such represents a positive recognition of the kinds of problems discussed in this article. This new rule, however, imposes certain exemptive conditions additional to or different from those already imposed by
Regulation D. It is anticipated, furthermore, that some kinds of
MULOE transactions will be subjected to a still unspecified degree of
substantive review by the Division staff, despite their exempt status. In
addition, offerings exempted from federal registration by means other
than Rules 505 or 506 will remain subject to pre-commencement notice
filing and substantive review under section 402(b )(9), which remains in
effect. The private placement of securities in Massachusetts, therefore,
will continue to generate questions of policy and practice similar to
those discussed in this article.
The adoption of MULOE, furthermore, does not address the problem of defining the role of merit regulation in Massachusetts, except
insofar as it will allow a somewhat greater number of transactions to
proceed on an exempt basis without merit review. MULOE thus represents some progress, but Massachusetts remains in search of a regulatory fulcrum.

